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Abstract
This article illustrates the problems and the prospects for a comprehensive durable con-
flict settlement in South Thailand, and how far Indonesia has played its significant role in help-
ing the said conflict settlement process. The fact shows  the sources of contemporary conflict in
South Thailand derive not only from the internal environmental factors, but also from the exter-
nal enviromental factors, such as the growing influence of jihadist ideology in the regional and
global arena. The conditions lead to the complexity of conflict issue and then attract the atten-
tion and concern of the international community. Indonesia has so far taken the lead in address-
ing conflict in South Thailand through a mediation approach at both the Track One (state actor)
and Track Two (non-state actor) levels. The 2008 Bogor peace talks and the conflict mediation
measures carried out by Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in this context are a milestone in
the course of Indonesia’s total diplomacy. Indonesia is challenged to play a more active role in
the quest for durable peace in the Southeast Asian region. Lessons learned from the past media-
tion process are expected to strengthen the Indonesia’s diplomacy in supporting the immediate
settlement of the South Thailand’s conflict.
Abstrak
Artikel ini menjelaskan masalah masalah dan prospek bagi penyelesaian konflik secara
komprehensif dan langgeng di Thailand Selatan, dan bagaimana Indonesia memainkan peranannya
secara signifikan.Fakta menunjukkan bahwa sumber konflik kontemporer di Thailand Selatan tidak
hanya berasal dari faktor lingkup internal semata, namun juga berasal dari faktor lingkup eksternal,
seperti perkembangan pengaruh ideologi jihadis di tingkat global dan regional. Faktor-faktor tersebut
membawa kepada kompleksitas persoalan konflik di wilayah ini dan selanjutnya mengundang perhatian
dan keprihatinan masyarakat internasional, khususnya kalangan negara-negara tetangga Thailand. Sejauh
ini Indonesia telah mempelopori upaya menyikapi konflik di Thailand Selatan melalui pendekatan me-
dia si baik melalui jalur pemerintah (track one) maupun jalur non-pemerintah (track two). Perundingan
perdamaian Bogor tahun 2008 dan upaya mediasi konflik yang dilakukan oleh Nahdlatul Ulama dan
Muhammadiyah dalam konteks ini merupakan tonggak sejarah dalam perjalanan diplomasi total Indo-
nesia. Indonesia tertantang memainkan peran lebih aktif lagi dalam mendukung terwujud nya perdamaian
langgeng di wilayah Asia Tenggara, khususnya di wilayah Thailand Selatan yang dirundung konflik.
Pelajaran yang dari proses mediasi di masa lampau diharapkan memperkokoh diplomasi Indonesia
mendukung penyelesaian konflik Thailand Selatan.
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Introduction
The twenty first century is a century of a
good hope for the future course of the Southern
Thailand region currently entering a new dimen-
sion of its conflict settlement process. During the
period of time the conflict intensity in this region
has been attracting the attention of international
community circle, either individual sovereign states
including ASEAN member countries or interna-
tional organizations, such as the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC). In this regard, they do
not stand idle but make constructive efforts to settle
the conflict. And even some come up with alter-
native options, such as the use of the third party’s
mediation. Indeed, the tension in predominantly
Muslim Southern Thailand historically termed
Patani, comprising the current provinces of
Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala, has long been
present, but it turned violent in early January 2004
when a group of gunmen launched raids on gov-
ernment offices, stormed an army camp in
Narathiwat province and instigated instability. The
situation deteriorated dramatically following the
case of the indiscriminate attack over the historic
Krue-Se mosque on 28 April 2004 by the Thai
military and the Tak Bai incident during the holy
month of Ramadan on 25 October 2005 which
claimed casualties among the Muslim protestors
mostly caused by asphyxiation as a result of being
smothered by bodies of other detainees. Follow-
ing the said incidents, the violence in the southern
provinces escalated sharply, both in the number
of incidents and the brutality of the violence.
The violent tension in the three southern
border provinces, namely Narathiwat, Pattani and
Yala, has made a profound effect on the morale of
local people. Since then it has also been a subject
of debate as well as a matter of deep concern par-
ticularly among the ASEAN member countries.
The majority of the population of Thailand’s three
southern provinces has more affinities to and shares
strong ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural bonds
with the Malaysian people across the border. The
collision of civilization between the South’s Malay
Muslims and the Buddhist Thai came to surface in
line with the efforts by the government to Thaiize
these Muslim Malay population. Under the national
integration policy, the government has incessantly
been attempting to integrate the South’s Muslim
populations into a united Thai state. Such a policy
was perceived a process of deculturalization that
subsequently stimulates armed insurgency by some
Muslim Malays in Southern Thailand in the 1960s
onwards (Arifi, 2008:6).
As a neighboring country and the world’s
largest Muslim country, Indonesia has been con-
tributing significantly to the settlement of the Patani
conflict through the mechanism of mediation at the
levels of both first track diplomacy and second
track diplomacy. The diplomatic efforts that have
been carried out by Indonesia in this case are le-
gally correct as clearly mandated in the Preamble
of the 1945 Constitution. Such kind of diplomacy
is benefited from the experiences of Indonesia in
the field of conflict resolution with its long series of
negotiations, domestically and regionally, such as
the settlement of the domestic conflicts in Poso
and Ambon, Aceh peace process, and Moro
Peace Talks. All these provide Indonesia’s diplo-
macy with a distinctive leverage to play a role as a
bridge builder or a mediator in support of a con-
flict termination.
To certain extent, Indonesia’s role in main-
taining world order and peace seems less effec-
tive due to certain reasons as clearly reflected in
the Patani conflict settlement measures. Despite
its complex nature, the Patani conflict settlement,
indeed, relies heavily on the good will of the Thai
government in this case. However, the prospect
for effective Patani conflict settlement is still open;
particularly if the approaches to accommodate the
interest of the two hostile parties in this context
are no longer relying on a business as usual (con-
ventional) approach but a business unusual (un-
conventional) one. By the spirit of learning for good
things and mistakes, the peace settlement process
should also be emphasizing the past experience
for a more constructive result in the future.
Theoretical Approaches
In order to analyze how far Indonesia’s
diplomacy in addressing the question of the long
standing South Thailand conflict, there are at least
two relevant theories that can be properly used in
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this context, namely the theory of conflict man-
agement and that of diplomacy (first track, sec-
ond track and multi-track). Theoretically conflict
management is a combination of three relevant el-
ements, namely prevention, containment and ter-
mination (Alagappa, 1995:369). Alagappa main-
tains that conflict Prevention is a part of the con-
flict management aiming to prevent a situation of
conflict from happening or at least to ensure that
no violent conflict occurs. In this regard, it pro-
vides a valuable contribution to dampening a de-
gree of conflict to a point where no use of force is
taken. Conflict containment refers to a situation
of self restraint in the use of force with the pur-
pose of denying victory to the aggressor as well
as simultaneously preventing the spread of con-
flict, which could enmesh other actors towards the
escalation of violence. Conflict termination is a
process to end a conflict by involving two hostile
parties for desired conflict settlement and resolu-
tion (Mitchell, 1989: 275-277). In essence, the
term ‘settlement’ is slightly different from the term
‘resolution’. Settlement refers for a particular con-
dition which leads violent hostilities to an end, while
resolution goes much further than that. It aims to
eliminate or eradicate the very sources of conflict,
and transform the attitude and behavior of the con-
flicting parties.
Meanwhile, Butler maintains that conflict
management is best understood as any attempt,
typically involving the third party, in controlling a
certain situation of conflict between  politically
motivated actors at the levels of the state or sub-
state. Conflict management aims to mitigate the
damaging impact of the ongoing conflicts. In cer-
tain extent, conflict management  originates from a
concern the part of a third party by containing the
conflict’s damaging and destabilizing effects to the
parties involved (semi-involved or non-involved
parties) as well as containing the violent escalation
of the conflict per se. Conflict management ap-
proaches come up when the prospects for con-
flict resolution seem dim, while the dynamics of
the conflict is marked by the tide of escalation that
needs an immediate response. The approaches
towards managing a conflict, based on this theory,
are divided into four categories, namely threat-
based, deterrence-based, adjudicatory, and
accommodationists. Threat-based category in-
cludes the use and or threat of force and other
tools to compel other parties, and thus it corre-
sponds most clearly with the threat and or use of
‘hard’ (coercive) power in the pursuit of interest.
Deterrence-based category includes the use and
or threat of force, and the various instruments of
coercive diplomacy to deter other parties. Like
the threat-based one, this category also addresses
the use of hard power by the parties concerned in
struggle of their interest. Adjudicatory category
includes legal, extra-legal, and normative institu-
tions and approaches to craft and reach legal set-
tlements with other parties. This category empha-
sizes the significance of recognition of and an ap-
peal to a system of norms, rights and legalities.
Accommodationists category includes traditional
and non-traditional diplomatic means to broker
agreement with other parties. Thus, it puts an em-
phasis on the use of soft (persuasive) power in
pursuit of any interest. The said approaches car-
ries with its different ramifications and conse-
quences, entails different cost, demands different
resources, and may succeed (or fail) under differ-
ent circumstances (Butler, 2009:13-14).
Along with the aforementioned theory,
analyzing the issue of the South Thailand settle-
ment also relies on the diplomacy theory approach
certainly. The essence of diplomacy is grouped into
four theoretical classifications. Firstly, diplomacy
is the conduct of relations between sovereign
states through the medium of officials based at
home or abroad. Secondly, diplomacy is an art of
using tact and skill in dealing with people. Thirdly,
diplomacy is an attempt to address a conflict (in-
ter or intra-state conflicts). Fourthly, diplomacy
is a synonym for foreign policy (Berridge and
James, 2003: 69-70).
Diplomacy which is an essentially political
activity and, well resourced and skilful, and a ma-
jor ingredient of power, functions as a channel of
communication of sovereign countries in pursuit
of its objectives of their foreign policies. In this
sense, its function is clearly reflected particularly
in the communication process between officials
designed to promote foreign policy either by for-
mal agreement or tacit adjustment; and also in the
discrete activities such as gathering information,
clarifying intentions, and engendering goodwill
(Berridge, 2005: 1). In its recent development,
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diplomacy is no longer a monopoly of a state as
the sole actor (track one). Diplomacy which is
carried out by the non-state actor (track two) in
this regard is quite common as well, the so-called
citizen diplomacy. In certain cases, first track and
second track diplomacy may be in partnership with
each other, called a twin-track diplomacy (Berridge
and James,2005:260).
The role of diplomacy as a channel of ef-
fective communication between the conflicting
parties is so important, although in certain cases it
involves the third parties with its intermediary func-
tion (a twin track) to work with the disputants to
resolve the conflict or transform it to make it less
destructive.The third parties in this regard could
come from the official or formal intermediaries cir-
cle, professional mediators, arbitrators, judges, as
well as the non governmental circle such as reli-
gious institutions, academics, former government
officials, non-governmental organizations, civil so-
ciety organizations, and thin tank. In some cases,
however, governments or government officials can
act as informal intermediaries when they facilitate
discussions among non-officials-private citizens or
groups of individuals-from conflicting parties
(Chigas, 2003:1).
In addition to the term track one, track two
and twin-track diplomacy as mentioned earlier, the
term ‘track three diplomacy’ is also known par-
ticularly among the diplomatic practitioners. This
kind of diplomacy deals with the mechanism of
the unofficial interventions at the grass root level.
It involves unofficial third parties working with
people from all walks of life and sectors of their
society to find ways to promote peace in settings
of violent conflict. It aims to build or rebuild bro-
ken relationships across the lines of division among
ordinary citizens in communities in a range of sec-
tors. The conduct of the track three diplomacy is
based on the premise that peace is most likely to
be built from the bottom up as well as from the
top down particularly at the grass-root level that
is potentially a microcosm of the larger conflict
(Chigas, 2003: 4).
Methodology
This research paper uses a particular meth-
odological approach in supporting the arguments
on the issue concerned. It relies heavily on the data
collection mostly obtained from the library research
database and other supporting materials such as
text books and periodicals, such as journals,
magazines and newspapers.
This paper employs a descriptive method
of analysis in elucidating a data-based analytical
argument with the special emphasis on the role of
Indonesia’s diplomacy in carrying out an interme-
diary mission in South Thailand conflict settlement.
More specifically, understanding the third party’s
role, in this case Indonesia’s diplomacy role, in
mediating the unceasing intra-state conflict in South
Thailand also uses a specific tool of analysis with
its relevant conflict variables-based issue identifi-
cation.
The time frame of the discussion in this
paper is deliberately concentrating on the South
Thailand conflict settlement process that began in
the year 2004 onwards. The choice of the year
2004 onwards as the time frame of the study is
simply based on the fact that the year 2004 on-
wards eyes the growing role of Indonesia’s diplo-
macy in addressing security challenges in the south-
ern territory of Thailand following the repressive
policy adopted by the Thai government aiming to
keep the local situation calm and conducive as well
as remain under control.
The Question of Patani
Patani, a term used to refer a region in
Southern Thailand, is located along the border with
Malaysia. The annexation by Thailand in 1902 the
Patani includes the present provincial areas of Yala,
Narathiwat and Pattani which are mainly popu-
lated by Muslim Malays. Historically, the annexa-
tion of Patani by the Reign of Siam in 1902 was
subsequently followed by using this area as a buffer
zone against the British Malaya. The annexation
was strengthened in 1909 by an Anglo-Siamese
treaty that drew border lines between Patani and
the Malay states of Kelantan, Perak, Kedah and
Perlis. Under the Siamese reign, the assimilation
policy began to introduce. The introduction of the
assimilation policy or Pan Thai policy was a mile-
stone towards demolishing the traditional local struc-
tures and opportunities which then incited strong
resistance by the local people (Valsesia, 2007: 2).
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Take the case of the 1921 Compulsory
Primary Education Act which obliged all children
to enter public primary school. Apart from the
centralization policy, the Act was perceived by the
local Muslim leaders a part of hidden agenda to
transform local cultural and religious values into
Thai values as well as to supplant the Pondoks
which were often branded a breading ground of
Islamic revivalism and the Patani Muslim Malay
resistance.or Islamic boarding schools. Such a thing
was perceived by the local Muslim Malays a de-
grading or destruction of their cultural and religious
identity. In addition, sending children in Thai pub-
lic schools with their secular teaching model would
remove their religious grounding and the religious
leaders, including the Tok Gurus would lose their
influential control over the community (Li, 2008:
1). Until the introduction of the 1944 Patronage
of Islam Act, the other negative profound impact
of the Pan Thai policy on the life of the local peo-
ple was also reflected by very few opportunities
in almost all areas of social life faced by the local
Muslim Malays. During this period of time, to some
extent the Siam ruler discriminated against the
South’s Muslim minority as clearly reflected in the
policy of banning them to serve as public serv-
ants, prohibiting them to wear a traditional Mus-
lim Malay clothes, and encouraging them to use
Thai names.
Under the Patronage of Islam Act in 1944,
the then Prime Minister PridiPhanomyong at-
tempted to win the heart of the Muslim Malay
community by placing the Muslim leaders in the
state structures as advisors to the King of Siam on
the Patani and Islamic matters. The policy to em-
brace the local Muslim Malays was, in fact, less
effective since it failed to curb the establishment of
Muslim resistance movements such as the Patani
People’s Movement (PPM) which was established
by Haji Sulong in the second part of the 1940s.
The PPM struggled for the political and cultural
rights of the Patani society including the implemen-
tation of Islamic law in the said southern prov-
inces by organizing numerous demonstrations. Until
the 1970s the situation in southern Thai provinces
became more strained along with more violent
actions staged by the local Muslim Malays move-
ments and the military counterblow launched by
the Thai authorities.
The PremTinasulanond’s rise to power in
1980 brought a more promising atmosphere par-
ticularly for the already conflicting area of Patani.
With his new strategy called “Thai Rom Yen”
(peace in the south), the Prem Tinasulanond ad-
ministration encouraged the participation of the
south’s Muslim Malay society among other things
in political life. In addition, PremTinasulanond also
showed them a lot of attention by the economic
development of the southern Thai provinces pro-
gram and the granting of broad amnesty to those
being charged with subversive activities against the
legitimate government. The other valuable contri-
bution of the Prem Tinasulanond administration to
bring peace in the Patani area included the estab-
lishment of Civil-Police-Military Taskforce 43
(CPM 43) and Southern Border Provinces Ad-
ministrative Centre (SBPAC). Until the 1997 fi-
nancial crisis era the PremTinasulanond’s policy
led the situation in the southern provinces to be
more conducive, among other things, marked by
the dramatic decrease of the local conflict inten-
sity. The situation changed dramatically soon after
ThaksinShinawatra was elected as Thailand’s
Prime Minister in 2001. Apart from his contro-
versial decision to dismantle the important institu-
tions like CPM 43 and SBPAC, Thaksin Shina-
watra downgraded the status level of the local
conflict from the status level of separatism oriented
conflict to that of non separatism oriented conflict.
The latter refers to a mere homeland security threat
caused by other reasons such as banditry and in-
cident deliberately created by the unscrupulous lo-
cal politicians (Valsesia, 2007: 2-4).
Indeed, the grievances among the South’s
Malay Muslims that have given rise to the conflict
are entirely local. The ongoing security instability
in Southern Thailand, in large part, is related to
the historically-rooted structural factors. The ques-
tions of education, employment in the public serv-
ice, relative economic deprivation, limited politi-
cal integration, and struggle for the maintenance
of ethnic-religious identity have so far been per-
ceived as the main source of the contemporary
violence. These factors have also been leading the
Patani Muslim Malays to the so long marginalized,
impoverished and brutalized situation. The intro-
duction of secular policies by the Thai government
in the southern region as a part of a half century
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assimilationist policy package and the growing in-
fluence of violent Jihadist ideology in the region
and around the world have certainly some effect
in this case (Melvin, 2007: 3).
The fact shows that some Patani Malays
are known to have fought in Afghanistan, that some
have been trained overseas in Jihadist guerilla
warfare, and that people in the region have links
with Islamist movements elsewhere in the world.
To some extent, the source of the violence in the
southern Thai provinces might be an identity crisis
among the locals resulting from the obliteration of
Patani Malay identity over the last century, the re-
sistance against the Pan Thai policy, and socio-
political discrimination and oppression, which leads
to the inability to find acceptance in the Thailand’s
socio-political mainstream, as well as the presence
of radical Islamic values to fill the void, particu-
larly among the young men. Empirically decul-
turalization contributes significantly to the turn to
extremism or radicalism among some young Mus-
lim. Such as phenomenon, albeit caused by differ-
ent factors, may be partly responsible for the radi-
calism in Southern Thailand (Jory, 2006: 43).
During his time in office, Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party
created a populist program-based extensive sup-
port network throughout the country, including in
the Deep South, and staged a frontal assault on
the legitimacy of the palace. In addition of the in-
ternal rivalry, Thaksin Shinawatra’s governmental
policies and conflict mismanagement had also
fuelled the violence particularly in the deep South.
Repressive state actions to curb the violence were
not so effective at all, and conversely it led to moral
legitimacy for a violent struggle among the South’s
Malay Muslim militants and radicalized Islamist
movements McCargo, 2009: 9-12). All these
made the Thaksin Shinawatra administration lose
control of the situation, particularly along with the
growing split between Thaksin Shinawatra and the
military in 2006 about how to prosecute the on-
going violent struggle in southern Thailand Melvin,
op.cit.: 2). This culminated in a military coup
staged by royalist officers led by the first Muslim
army commander-in-chief General Sonthi-
Boonyaratkalin on 19 September 2006
(McCargo, op.cit.: 8). General SonthiBoonya-
ratkalin and his military colleagues were widely
seen as having a better understanding and experi-
ence of the Southern Thai provinces than Thaksin
Shinawatra and appear to favor a softer approach
to the crisis that Thaksin Shinawatra who was of-
ten criticized both at home and abroad for his tough
approach to fighting the insurgents (BBC News:
2006).
The optimism for a possible resolution to
the conflict in the southern region in the post-
Thaksin Shinawatra era was beyond expectation.
The violence in this area has significantly escalated
marked by the increasing number of casualties and
the brutality of the intensified attacks by the local
militants. Any new approaches taken by the Thai
authorities to end conflict in the deep South is still
unsettled until this moment, and conversely the
nature of conflict has been growing more pressing
from time to time (Melvin, op.cit.: 2-3). Such a
fact is certainly a challenge to the neighboring
states, including Indonesia to play a pro-active role
and grasp every opportunity towards a new con-
ciliatory approach-based conflict settlement in
Southern Thailand.
Indonesia’s ‘Peace Maker‘ Role
In accordance with the preamble of the
1945 Constitution, it clearly mentions that “Sub-
sequent thereto, to form a government of the
state of Indonesia which shall protect all the
people of Indonesia and their entire native land,
and in order to improve the public welfare, to
advance the intellectual life of the people and
to contribute to the establishment of a world
order based on freedom, abiding peace and
social justice.” To implement this Constitution
mandate, Indonesia implements an independent
and active foreign policy in pursuit of its national
interest at the regional and global intercourses.
Based on this kind of basic principles, Indonesia’s
independent and active foreign policy is not a neu-
tral and passive in character. However, Indonesia
remains committed to consistently voice and par-
ticipate actively in maintaining world order.
As a regional power in the Southeast Asian
region and the current chairman of ASEAN, In-
donesia is certainly on the right position to take
the lead in addressing common challenges being
faced by the countries in the region through the
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regional conflict management framework which
includes, among other things, the conflict media-
tion mechanism. In the case of conflict settlement
process in Southern Thailand, for example, Indo-
nesia had so far attempted to play an active role in
addressing an incessant conflict situation in the re-
gion not only at the multilateral level such as
ASEAN and the Organization of Islamic Confer-
ence (OIC), but also at the bilateral level through
the mechanism of mediation approaches. In this
regard, the mediation role played by Indonesia
included Track One-based mediation and Track
Two-based mediation. On the Track One media-
tion basis, Indonesia participated actively in spon-
soring peace talks process between the hostile
actors of the Patani conflict in Bogor, while the
Track Two mediation basis was clearly reflected,
at the Thai government’s request, by the involve-
ment of the two prominent Civil Society Organi-
zations (CSOs), Nahdlatul Ulama and Muham-
madiyah, to help bridge the communication gap
between the Centre and the South towards an
immediate conflict settlement in the Southern Thai
provinces.
On the Track One level, in September
2008 Indonesia mediated peace talks between the
Thai government and representatives of the Mus-
lim community in Southern Thailand, although it
did not end in any result. The talks that took place
in Bogor Presidential Palace and included the then
Vice President JusufKalla and Indonesian Ambas-
sador to Thailand M. Hatta concluded with the
commitment to end years of conflict that had claims
many casualties at both sides. In principle the two
sides agreed that the settlement should be con-
ducted peacefully through dialogue forum and
should be in line with the Constitution of Thailand.
During the talks, the Thai government sent five
negotiators, headed by General Khwanchart-
Klahan, the Supreme Commander of the South-
ern Border Provinces Peace Building Command
(SBPPC) which oversees the country’s southern
provinces. The country’s southern Malay Muslims
were represented by leaders of the Pattani Malay
Consultative Congress (PMCC), an umbrella or-
ganization of insurgent groups in Southern Thai-
land. Demands by Thai Muslims include, among
other things, the introduction of Islamic law and
making ethnic Pattani Malay (Yawi) a working lan-
guage in the region, as well as the improvement of
the local economy and education system. Previ-
ous negotiations, including that sponsored by the
Malaysian government, failed to halt violence within
the three provinces, because of a lack of trust be-
tween the parties, as well as the Thai government’s
failure to identify which groups or individuals it
should talk to. The Bogor peace talks should be
continued by another second round of negotia-
tions on 1 November 2010 at the same place, but
it failed to realize for certain reasons (The Jakarta
Post, 2008: 1) .
Indeed, the Government of Thailand did
not recognize the legitimacy of the Bogor peace
talks. As officially stated by the Thai Foreign Min-
istry’s spokesperson TharitCharungvat on 22 Sep-
tember 2010, the Government of Thailand strongly
denied the charges against its involvement in the
said peace talks. Thailand notified that she did not
ask Indonesia to serve as a mediator for the Patani
conflict settlement as well (Kompas, 2008: 15).
In other words, the Thai government refused to
be associated with the negotiations which were
sponsored by the then Vice President Jusuf Kalla,
who is credited with helping end three decades of
separatist violence in Aceh in 2005.
Such a fact is a test case as well as a chal-
lenge to Indonesia to play a more active role in the
efforts to maintain regional security and stability.
Indonesia has incessantly kept her commitment to
play an active role in supporting any regional peace
process, including the peace process in the South-
ern Thai provinces. Therefore, Indonesia welcomes
any Thai government’s request for assistance, but
insisted she would not make any pre-emptive in-
terference. Moreover, Indonesia had past experi-
ence in playing a successful role as a third-party
facilitator between Manila and the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) under the Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC) forum in the early
1990s. The said peace talks aimed to find solu-
tions to conflicts in the Southern Philippines. Until
today, Indonesia has also been taking part actively
in helping implement the 1996 Peace Agreement
under the auspices of the Organization of the Is-
lamic Conference (OIC) (Sukma, 2010: 3).
The Bogor meeting was arranged follow-
ing a visit by the then Thai Prime Minister Samak
Sundaravej to Jakarta early 2008. After his visit,
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the Thai cabinet agreed in June to study the peace
process in Indonesia’s once-rebellious Aceh prov-
ince as a model for resolving the conflict in south-
ern Thailand. As notified by Presidential Spokes-
man Dino Patti Djalal, President Soesilo Bambang
Yudhoyono assigned the then Vice President
JusufKalla to mediate the peace talks soon after
the President met delegations of both sides. With
regard to the Aceh peace formula, It might be dif-
ficult for the Thai government to use the Aceh les-
son as a model, since both have some differences
in certain extent. The differences rest on some
high-principled things, such as the legitimacy of the
representative of the South’s Malay Muslims, in-
cluding those representing the insurgent groups.
In the case of the Ace peace talks, for instance,
the Indonesian government knew that the leaders
of the Free Aceh Movement with whom it was
dealing were in daily contact with the rebel com-
manders in the field (Associated Press, 2008).
If accurately observed, Thailand seems
somewhat reluctant to accept any kind of media-
tion as frequently offered by the third party including
by ASEAN member countries in resolving the
conflict in South Thailand. The attitude of Thai-
land in this case is totally different if compared to
the Philippines and Indonesia which are so open
to any kind of assistance in the conflict settlement
framework. Indonesia has so far been attempting
to coax the Thai government into receiving the
presence of the third party in helping mediate the
conflicting parties in the Southern Thai provinces,
particularly the offer coming from ASEAN mem-
ber countries circle. The efforts made by Indone-
sia and ASEAN in this case have so far failed to
get a positive response from the Thai government.
The attitude of Thailand that remains in firm posi-
tion to opposing to any kind of foreign interven-
tion in its domestic affairs could be affected by her
historical pride as a sovereign nation that had never
been occupied by any foreign country (Wirajuda:
2010).
As Ambassador IsornPocmontri of the
Thai Foreign Ministry mentioned clearly that the
Patani issue is a domestic problem and the move
towards internationalizing this issue is beyond the
policy or official position adopted by the Thai gov-
ernment. Thailand considers that things would get
more complicated if a foreign intervention was
present. Nevertheless, the government of Thailand
as Prime Minister AbhisitVejjajiva mentioned that
Thai government much appreciated all construc-
tive measures taken by the neighboring countries,
including Indonesia, in the efforts to bring peace in
the already conflicting area of Southern Thailand.
It is fully aware that the situation anywhere in the
region with violence, including in the Southern
Thailand, has a negative profound impact on the
stability of the whole region and ASEAN as well
(The Jakarta Post, 2010: 9).
On the Track Two level, the settlement of
the Patani conflict had so far been involving non
state actor circle as well, such as Malaysia’s Ma-
hathir Muhamad Peace Foundation and Indone-
sia’s Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), namely
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Les-
sons learned from the Mahathir Muhamad’s me-
diation process clearly showed that the three
rounds of peace talks between senior Thai mili-
tary officers and exiled leaders of the older insur-
gency groups brokered including PULO on the
Malaysian island Langkawi during 2005, in fact,
fully depended on the situation on the ground and
on the good will of the Thai government. Indeed,
the talks resulted in some constructive commit-
ments such as a joint peace and development plan
for the South that rejected the idea of independ-
ence (or even autonomy) but called for an am-
nesty for exiled leaders, the restoration of the
SBPAC and the introduction of the Malay lan-
guage in schools. This initiative, however, had mini-
mal impact on the ground due to the exiled lead-
ers’ little influence over the new generation of in-
surgents and the Thai government’s attitude that
ignored the recommendations made during the
talks (Storey, 2007:2).
It is understandable that the measures to-
wards opening a productive dialogue with the
Patani insurgents for the South’s durable peace is
impeded by some crucial factors, such as the struc-
ture of the insurgency (Melvin, 2007: 38). Unlike
the Aceh insurgency group ‘Free Aceh Movement’
or ‘Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)’ whose or-
ganizational structure is clear and command line-
based, there is no such clear and command line-
based organizational structure of South Thailand’s
insurgent group which represents the interest of
the diverse range of the local insurgent factions. It
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remains a real challenge to determining who is le-
gitimately representing and voicing the common
interest of the South’s insurgent groups during the
negotiations as happened during the 2008 Bogor
peace talks.
In the context of the role played by Indo-
nesian CSOs, NU and Muhammadiyah, in medi-
ating conflict in the southern Thai provinces, it
yielded a relatively concrete thing and paved the
way for both hostile sides to build up mutual trust
and mutual understanding between them. Although
their Patani missions were no more than a just
moral obligation, the presence of NU and Mu-
hammadiyah with its Malay Muslim approaches is
so important, particularly in bridging the differences
and cleavages between the Center and the South
towards an effective national reconciliation as well
as improving the already conflicting situation in the
southern region (NU Online, 2008). Moreover,
the southern conflicts result from misunderstand-
ing and suspicion and have nothing to do with re-
ligion. Only a certain group of people with bad
intentions use religion as a political tool and dis-
torted Islamic teachings.
The Thai government has unceasingly tried
to win the heart of the south’s Malay Muslims.
During the ThaksinShinawatra administration, for
example, some fundamental policies were taken
by the Thai government to accommodate the in-
terest of the locals, among other things, by estab-
lishing an Islamic Bank, setting up new Islamic
universities and educational institutions in coop-
eration with leading academic institutions such as
Cairo University, allocating the Hajj pilgrimage’s
special funds for needy Muslim Thais, and boost-
ing the South’s development growth with purpose
of raising the standard of living of Muslim Thais.
In addition, the Thai government also empowered
the 48 member National Reconciliation Commis-
sion (NRC) for helping ease southern problems in
order to create reconciliation and bring peace in
the area (Inside Thailand Review, 2008:1-3).
Such policies, however, were not too ef-
fective to curb the insurgency in the deep South as
reflected by the ongoing escalation of dissension
and the growing distrust and dissatisfaction with
the Center in this area. Thus, open warfare be-
tween the Center and the South detonated by the
failed national integration due to the incompatibil-
ity of the two languages-cultures (Buddhist Thai
and Muslim Malay) will never cease to threaten
the life of the Muslim people in the southern re-
gion as well as national integrity, economic stabil-
ity and national security (Walker, 2005:115-116).
Learning from the aforementioned Indo-
nesia’s Track One and Track Two experiences, it
is clear that an effective mediation process should
address common issues faced by both hostile par-
ties in this country such as the ethno-national griev-
ance rather than any sensitive issues that become
their concern. Such sensitive issues, such as a de-
mand for wide-range autonomy in the three south-
ern border provinces and the internationalization
of the Patani issue, will make the talks fail to make
much headway. Thus, a logical option for placing
the South’s Malay Muslims in the Thai socio-cul-
tural mainstream really makes sense instead of the
struggle for greater autonomy that risks strong re-
jection from the Thai government. With no such
conflict resolution, the southern region will be al-
ways torn by distrust and durable peace remains
a distant prospect.
With regard to the conflict settlement meas-
ure in Southern Thailand, Indonesia has broader
chance to continue playing more proactive in seek-
ing a peaceful solution between the Thai govern-
ment and the South’s Malay Muslim community,
particularly through a mechanism of the Track
Two-based conflict mediation approach. In this
context, conflict mediation as played by non-state
actors like NU and Muhammadiyah is a suggested
model to adopt since it proved acceptable to both
sides, the Center and the South. In such a situa-
tion, the role of the government is still crucial al-
though it is behind the scenes. This is because an
effective mediation performed by the non-state ac-
tors, including from the CSO circle like NU and
Muhammadiyah, has need of the government’s full
support to make the said mediation process pos-
sible.
Tool of Analysis
In order to ascertain the question of Patani
in a broader perspective, there are some tools of
analysis to rely on, among other things, the Causal
Loop Diagram (CLD). As a part of the systems
thinking, the use of CLD aims to understand the
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conflict determinant variables and the causal rela-
tionship between the variables. Of these variables,
the prime variables, the so called ‘leverage’, are
easily known. As a ‘leverage variable’, it consti-
tutes a principal variable of a particular issue to
deal with. The yardstick in identifying the ‘lever-
age’ variables relies on the weight of each variable
based on the number of loop and the length of
loop. The more the number of loop and its length
of loop a variable owns, the more significant the
variable will be (Kajian Paradigma Modul 1 A-
2, 2010: 91-102).
In the case of Southern Thailand’s con-
flict, it is identified a number of variables having a
profound impact on the future course of the con-
flict settlement per se. These include Pan-Thai
policy, Thai educational system, job opportunity,
socio-economic injustice, Thai ‘extractive’ authori-
ties, Patani’s public distrust, Patani Muslim cler-
ics’ influence, Islamic radicalism, Islamic fanatisicm,
deculturalization, religious tolerance, Patani’s
diaspora influence, socio-cultural discrimination,
and homeland security. All these, to some extent,
are considered relevant variables to the escalation
of conflict in the Southern Thailand in the past few
decades.
Based on the CLD-based analysis as de-
scribed above, it shows that the Pan-Thai policy,
popularly called ‘a assimilationist policy’, is a prin-
cipal leverage with the 56 loops, then followed by
the variable of Patani’s public distrust with 40 loops
on the second principal leverage. It means that the
measures toward resolving conflict in Southern
Thailand is highly recommended to address and
put an emphasis on at least the two principal vari-
ables. With special emphasis on the said principal
variables, it makes the conflict mediation process
carried out by the third party, such as NU and
Muhammadiyah, more effective. The role of the
third party in this regard is vitally important, par-
ticularly in its position as a bridge builder in order
to find a common ground for negotiations between
the Center and the South towards a truly national
reconciliation and durable peace on the Southern
Thai provinces.
Conclusion
Conflict in Southern Thailand is relatively
complex in nature, encompassing almost all kinds
of issues including the most sensitive one dealing
with religious practices. The obstacles to seeking
a peaceful solution over the conflict in Southern
Thailand, among other things, are caused by the
stubborn attitude of both sides. They have so far
been stuck on their basic principles and position
on the issue concerned. For the Thai government,
for example, it takes the stance that the question
of Patani is a domestic problem of Thailand, al-
though it fails lucidly to analyze situation on the
ground and follow an appropriate strategy to
tackle the unceasing conflict situation in the south-
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ern region. The Thai authorities that lack under-
standing of the roots of the problems and Thai
Muslims’ ways of life have increasingly aggravated
the already conflicting situation. This leads subse-
quently to the growing concern among the inter-
national community particularly the Muslim world
and neighboring countries.
As a neighboring country and the largest
Muslim nation in the world, Indonesia has con-
tributed significantly to the conflict settlement in
Southern Thailand. Such a contribution is reflected
in the active participation of Indonesia in support-
ing a peaceful solution in Southern Thailand through
the Track One and Track Two-based mediation
mechanisms. Indonesia’s contribution evidently
mirrored in the Bogor peace talks and the conflict
mediation performed by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
and Muhammadiyah is a fact. However, all these
measures seem less effective and need further ac-
tion that is more appropriate, including by the in-
volvement of the third party-sponsored mediation,
in addressing the questions on the ground.
In the efforts to supporting the effective
conflict resolution in Southern Thailand, the con-
flict resolution formula should be focusing the stra-
tegic issues as clearly formulated in the five sound
policy recommendations as follows.
(1) Indonesia, as a ‘big brother’ country
in the region, should play a more active role in the
effort to consistently help maintain peace and or-
der in the region, including the measures towards
a comprehensive conflict settlement in Southern
Thailand; (2) Indonesia is highly recommended to
rely on the Track Two (non-state actors) mecha-
nism to fill the void caused by the absence of the
mediation at the Government-to-Governmentlevel
(Track One) and avoid the impression that Indo-
nesia is interfering with Thailand’s domestic issue.
The role of the Indonesian government is to em-
power and support the non-state actors, in this
regard NU and Muhammadiyah, in order to con-
tinue their peace agenda to help end conflict in
Southern Thailand through the mediation mecha-
nism; (3) Indonesia should come up with more con-
structive options for creating durable peace in the
southern Thailand by accommodating the interest
of both sides, the Center and the South. The quest
for an effective conflict settlement in the Southern
Thailand should also address the principal issues
that lie at the root of conflict, such as the issues of
Pan-Thai policy and Patani’s public distrust;
(4) Indonesia should emphasize a national inte-
gration-based settlement approach in dealing with
the South Thailand issue. Such an approach is a
more rational option rather than the Autonomy-
for-the South Peace option since it brings the lo-
cal Malay Muslims to the Thai socio-cultural main-
stream, so that they are no longer perceiving
‘strangers’ in their own native homeland; (5) In-
donesia should ensure that the national integration
concept adopted by the Thai government to ad-
dress the South Thailand issue should also inte-
grate the Islamic boarding schools’ curriculum into
the accredited national educational system. The
curriculum compatibility between the public
schools and private Islamic schools in Indonesia,
including those run by the Pondok Pesantren (Is-
lamic boarding school) circle, is an appropriate
model to introduce in Southern Thailand.
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